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I. INTRODUCTION
This paper attempts to situate the current economic
'upswing1 in the South African economy in the context of the
on-going economic crisis which is plaguing the international
capitalist economy. I will argue that the two phenomena
are integrally linked. The principal features of the
international capitalist crisis and, even more centrally,
the measures hitherto taken to resolve this crisis, are the
principal factors contributing to the present 'upswing1 in
the South African economy.
The first section outlines the major features of the
international capitalist crisis and the measures taken to
counteract it. The second section examines some aspects of
the current 'upswing' in the South African economy. In the
final section, in the form of a critique of some writings on
the subject, some implications for the future trajectory of
capitalist development in South Africa are drawn.
Clearly, there are highly complex issues involved, and a
short article can only hope to provide some fruitful points
for departure.
II. PRINCIPAL FEATURES OF THE CONTEMPORARY
INTERNATIONAL CAPITALIST CRISIS
I would suggest that the following are the central
specific features of the current crisis:
1. This is indeed an international and a capitalist crisis,
The downswings and (to a lesser extent) the upswings in
the economies of all the advanced capitalist countries
are closely synchronised.
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2. The recession of 1974-5 was preceeded by a long period
in which the rate of profit was tending to fall in the
advanced capitalist countries. In the post-recession
period, rates of profit were increased somewhat, but
not dramatically.
3. The upswing following the severe recession of 1974-5
has been weak, hesitant and of short duration.
4. Inflationary pressures are international and endemic.
They are only somewhat moderated when recession
deepens.
5. The crisis is associated with a changing configuration
of imperialist forces. This is often summarised as 'a
decline in the hegemony of the United States'.
These features are all closely inter-related. However,
for ease of exposition, I will deal with each in turn.
Capitalism is an international system and severe reces-
sions - 1929 for example - have always been experienced
simultaneously in virtually all capitalist countries.1
In the more minor recessions, however, contractions in
one country Were frequently offset by expansion in
other countries. The expansion of exports served to
limit the recession in the former. But, the 1974-5
recession was felt everywhere in the capitalist world,
if not in the same magnitude. Of the OECD countries,
the decline in industrial production from peak to
trough was greatest in Switzerland and Japan (about 20
per cent) and least in Sweden (four per cent), Canada
(seven per cent) and Spain (10 per cent).2 Moreover,
the degree of synchronisation was very marked.3
The capitalist character of the crisis is revealed
most starkly by the fact that none of the principal
planned economies suffered a decline in industrial
production in 1974-6. While their rate of growth
certainly declined, it was still distinctly positive.4
The universality and synchronisation of the recession
amongst the developed capitalist countries, is a testi-
mony to the growing inter nationalisation of the capi-
talist system. This internationalisation has acquired
a whole new dimension with the spectacular rise of the
Multinational Corporations (MNCs), particularly post-
1960, and the contemporaneous development of the inter-
national capital and money markets - notably the Euro-
dollar market.5 One major consequence of these
developments, significant for the analysis here, is
that the national monetary policies are likely to be
rendered far less effective.^ The Euro-dollar market
allows for the rapid and unregulated switching of
currencies, while national credit controls can be cir-
cumvented by companies borrowing abroad. Similarly,
MNCs are able, using internal accounting changes, to
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transfer moneys into anticipated strong currencies.7
At the same time, and for the same reasons, therefore,
as nationally-based monetary regulation has become
increasingly ineffective, the possibilities for
'private' speculation in currencies has much increased.£
2. The measurement of profit rates is difficult and there
is no universal agreement on profit trends. However,
most studies of the rate of profit have revealed a
general tendency for the rate of profit to fall from
circa the early 1950s. This is particularly true of
the rate of profit in the principal capitalist country
- the U.S.9
The 'recovery' in the rate of profit in the 1974-5
recession and the subsequent period was real, but by no
means restored profit rates to their post-World War Two
peaks. Again this is particularly true of the U.S.10
The explanation for the movement in the rate of
profit, which is indeed the capitalist crisis, cannot
be attempted here. But, it does seem to provide a
striking verification of the Marxian thesis of a
tendency for the rate of profit to fall in capitalism.
This tendency occurs, in terms of Marx's analysis, as a
consequence of a rising organic composition of capital,
unless offset by an equal increase in the rate of
surplus value.1 1 Economic crisis can function so as
to restore the rate of profit, in three primary ways.
First, by the 'devalorisation1 or indeed open destruc-
tion of capital - bankruptcies, plant-closings, etc.
Second, through raising the rate of surplus value -
growing unemployment, allowing for a limiting of wage
increases, reduction in strike activity, etc. Third,
through a reduction in the prices of raw materials,
purchased mainly from the Third World.
All three occurred as a consequence of the 1974-5
recession, but to a limited extent. A number of raw
material price decreases were recorded, but 'energy-
related1 commodities rose substantially in price.12
Unemployment expanded significantly, and even in the
1
 recovery' period stood at historically high levels in
the OECD countries.13 This did allow for a tightening
of labour discipline and real wage deductions in a
number of cases14 - but, labour organisation was such
as to ensure that this was not of a sufficient magni-
tude to restore the rate of profit to its former levels.
The key issue is that of capital devalorisation -
and here lies the explanation for the post-19 74-5
period. The devalorisation of capital was distinctly
limited. There were a few large-scale bankruptcies,15
but the effects were largely limited to the smaller
capitals. The 'corporate structure1, monopoly capital
of the large trusts, was little affected.
The underlying reason for the limited effect of the
recession in terms of capital devalorisation, must rest
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with governmental counter-cyclical economic policies.16
Various forms of monetary 'pump-priming' and deficit
financing served to ensure that the level of output,
for the economy as a whole, did not fall too catastro-
phically, while the harder-hit monopoly corporations
were, in addition, accorded forms of direct subsidy.17
These subsidies allowed them to continue in production.
With the capital stock largely intact, excess
capacity, which had characterised production prior to
the 1974-5 recession, continued in the 'recovery'.18
The subsidised survival of Chrysler and many of the
European car firms, for example, meant that the most
efficient corporations were unable to operate at full-
capacity. The continuance of excess capacity there-
fore limited the extent to which the rate of profit
rose in the 'recovery' period.
3. The limited recovery of the rate of profit in the post-
recession period was the principal factor underlying
the weakness of the international capitalist economy.
As we outlined above, this limited recovery in the
rate of profit is to be located in limited reductions
in primary commodity prices, limited increases in the
rate of surplus value, and, in particular, in a
severely 'retarded' devalorisation of capital. The
net effect was to ensure that.reinvestment in produc-
tive activities was severely curtailed. This further
encouraged investments of a more speculative character.
4. Inflation is a complex phenomenon, and no attempt is
made to provide an explanation here. But, it does
seem that inflation, which once again is a phenomenon
of international capitalism, is linked to two principal
factors. First, the economic dominance of monopoly
corporations, and second, the expansionist monetary
policies pursued by capitalist governments.19
Firstly, the absence of competition has allowed the
larger firms considerable leeway to utilise their power
to unilaterally raise prices without fear of retali-
ation. 2 0 Thus, even in a recession, larger corpora-
tions will tend to reduce their output, but increase
their mark-up in order to maintain profitability
levels.21 A recession will moderate price increases,
principally via the effect of a declining demand on the
competitive sector and reductions in the prices of raw
materials as demand falls.22 Generally, only when the
recession really deepens, and the larger corporations
collectively have massive excess capacity, will this
tend to provoke major price reductions in the monopoly
sector.
Secondly, the expansionist monetary and fiscal
policies of the advanced capitalist countries have led
to a massive expansion of the money supply - both
nationally and internationally, and this is particular-
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ly true of the United States post-1958 (see below).
There is indeed a relation between the expansion of the
money supply and the persistence of inflation. The
development of international monetary and capital
markets have provided an additional impetus, particu-
larly by allowing avenues for the circumvention of
tight money policies.23 The massive budget deficits
of the advanced capitalist countries in 1975-6 were the
real reason for the subsequent 'recovery1. But, they
added further impetus to inflation.
Apart from the state's general monetary pump-priming,
in order to maintain the level of total demand, the
other principal mechanisms designed to limit the
recession by reinstating the rate of profit, are also
clearly inflationary. Direct subsidisation of
inefficient firms, tax reductions on company profits,
assuming more of the costs of private capital, e.g. by
subsiding or taking over scientific research, and
various unproductive state expenditures which provide
an outlet for capitalist production, e.g. defence, all
contribute to inflation. The persistence of a
condition of stag-flation (if not slump-flation) - the
coexistence of stagnant production and rising prices -
reflects the contradictory character of capitalism in
its monopoly phase, viz. a tendency to the rate of
profit to fall which produces stagnation, on the one
hand, and an opposing set of counter-tendencies,
primarily initiated by the state, which produce
inflation, on the other.
These are structural, and hence endemic features of
advanced capitalism. If inflation persists in the
advanced capitalist countries - the continuing devalu-
ation of paper currencies - this will clearly have
major long-term repercussions for South Africa, the
world1s principal producer of gold.24
5. But, the value of the key official currency, the inter-
national reserve currency, the U.S. Dollar, is of
particular importance. The declining value of the
dollar is one reflection of the limitations of U.S.
imperialist hegemony.
The agreement reached at Bretton Woods in 1944 had,
as its bedrock, the convertibility of the U.S. Dollar
into gold at the fixed price of $35 per ounce. This
price had in fact been set as early as 1934, when the
Roosevelt Administration, in the context of the U.S.
holding massive gold stocks, had raised the price of
gold. It had arbitrarily stopped at $35 per ounce.25
The strict convertibility of the dollar into gold
depended upon two basic factors. First, maintaining a
continuing supply of newly-mined gold, which could be
purchased at that fixed price, i.e. a regulation of the
gold market such that newly-mined gold would be offered
to the Central Banks at $35 per ounce. Second, and
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closely interrelated, that the supply of dollars was
restricted. The latter was the crucial condition - an
over-supply of dollars would lead to a swapping of
dollars for gold and a drain upon the U.S. gold
reserves.
The U.S., in particular, sought to control the
market for newly-mined gold by attempting to enforce
sale through the Central Banks of the I.M.F. at the
fixed price of $35 per ounce - a policy which was
strongly opposed by South Africa.26
But, the crucial factor which finally destroyed the
Bretton Woods Agreement was the persistence of massive
U.S. Balance of Payments deficits. Whereas in the
first decade or so after the War, there was a severe
dollar shortage internationally, this gave way to ever-
larger dollar surpluses.27 The key turn-around date
was 1958. In that year, U.S. gold reserves fell below
the level of its official liabilities denominated in
dollars. At the same time, the U.S. Balance of
Payments produced a very large deficit. From this
date, large outflows of gold from the U.S. continued
unabated, as dollar-holders sought to exercise their
right to acquire gold.
The U.S. responded by progressively and unilaterally
cutting the links between the dollar and gold. This
occurred in three major steps. In 1961, the 'Gold
Pool1 was created whereby several European countries
made a commitment to sell some of their gold stocks in
order to maintain the dollar price for gold. In 1968
the U.S. ended its commitments to private holders of
dollars who now could no longer acquire gold for their
dollars. In 1971 the 'gold window' was closed to
official purchasers as well.
In very broad terms, both the persistence of the U.S.
Balance of Payments deficit, and the measures taken as
a consequence by the U.S. to cut the links between the
dollar and gold, are to be understood in the context of
U.S. imperialist hegemony. At the same time, it
points to some of the limitations inherent in this
hegemonic position.
The Balance of Payments deficit must be understood,
in part, as a consequence of U.S. military expenditures.
Such expenditures, particularly during the Vietnam War,
led to a massive drain of dollars abroad directly,
while indirectly funnelling much of the R and D,
skilled personnel, etc. away from the production of
marketed commodities.28 U.S. 'Aid', special trade
relations with 'strategic' countries like South Korea
and Taiwan, and other factors linked to the U.S.
imperialist presence made further contributions to the
deficit. The challenges to U.S. hegemony - the direct
resistance of Cuba and Vietnam for example, and the
challenges posed by its economic rivals, the other
developed countries, were severe threats to that hege-
The Current 'Upswing' in the South African Economy
monic position and inter alia, contributed very
significantly to the deficit.
But, the U.S. response reveals that, while
challenged and circumscribed, its hegemonic position
within the international capitalist system has, in
essence, been maintained.29 Instead of abiding by the
rules of Bretton Woods and exercising expenditure
reductions in order to limit its payments deficits, so
stemming the outflow of dollars, a policy which would
have entailed economic restraint at home and/or cur-
tailment of U.S. 'activities' abroad, the U.S. has
essentially adopted what came to be known as 'a passive
strategy1 for the Balance of Payments. In essence, .
this strategy, given elaborate theoretical justifi-
cation by the economic 'establishment',30 was that the
U.S. should continue to run its economy at an 'optimal'
level. The resultant outflows of dollars abroad would
have to be 'absorbed' by other countries. The
'pressure' on other countries, notably the advanced
capitalist-country rivals of the U.S., arises in two
ways. First, they would be forced to buy dollars in
order to maintain the value of the dollar because the
dollar represented much of the backing for their own
currencies. Second, an effective devaluation of the
dollar or revaluation of their own currency would
severely jeopardise their trading position vis-a-vis
the U.S. Finally, a severe monetary crisis, brought
on by a major decline of the dollar, would jeopardise
the whole international economy.
The economic rivals of the U.S. have thus been
forced to accept a situation whereby the U.S. runs
persistent deficits, and to absorb the resultant dollar
surpluses.31 But, the fact that the major capitalist
operates outside of the monetary rules, in order to
ensure its continued hegemony,3^ has injected a tremen-
dous note of uncertainty into monetary relations and
the stability of the system. There clearly are limi-
tations to this process of dollar absorption, and the
spectre of a monetary collapse is consequently a real
one. In addition, the outflow of dollars has added
tremendously to international liquidity, and is the
principal factor in the rapid growth of the Euro-dollar
market. To reiterate, these developments have made a
significant contribution to fuelling international
inflation. Monetary inflation, and the threat of a
monetary collapse, are the principal factors encourag-
ing 'alternative1 forms of wealth-holding.
The major conclusions to be drawn from the above analysis
are summarised here.
Inflation, the devaluation of monetary assets, is a per-
sistent and a structural feature of capitalism. Firstly, as
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a consequence of monopoly control of markets. Secondly, as
a result of governmental policies designed to ensure the
maintenance of demand. Thirdly, at an 'international
level1, as the consequence of a massive increase in inter-
national liquidity, which must be grounded in an analysis of
U.S. imperialist hegemony.33 At the 'national level1, it
represents the outcome of forces, principally directed by
the state, designed to counteract the tendency of profit
rates to fall. At the 'international level1, it reflects
the persistence of, but at the same time, growing threat to,
U.S. imperialist hegemony.
One consequence of the latter feature has been the
instability and devaluation of the dollar - the inter-
national reserve currency. There is an analogy here with
the situation of the early 1930s. In 1931 the devaluation
of the key reserve currency, the pound sterling, led to the
first substantial price increase for gold.34 While British
hegemony in the imperialist system was uncontested, a strong
currency could ensure a fixed relation between it and gold.
Devaluation of the pound sterling reflected the decline in
British imperialist hegemony. With American imperialist
hegemony undisputed and the dollar strong, a similar period
of a fixed price for gold could be maintained. The
challenges to U.S." imperialist hegemony in the contemporary
period, have once again, lifted the ceiling on gold.
At the same time as monetary assets have been subject to
devaluation, the rate of profit in direct productive invest-
ment has been low and declining. This decline was only
partially reversed by the major recession of 1974-5 - that
the reversal was only partial was due primarily to the
limited devalorisation of capital. As a consequence,
capital is searching desperately for profitable avenues for
•investment' in order to ensure an adequate return.
Since neither productive investment, nor monetary assets,
yield adequate returns, the search has been directed else-
where.35 A wide range of possibilities exist - property,
antiques, certain raw materials, etc. and ever more
crucially, gold and silver.
The U.S. has now cut all effective links between the
dollar and a fixed quantity of gold. The controlled market
for gold gave way to a two-tier market, and now effectively
a free-market for gold. The price of gold is not now
subject to any major manipulation designed to limit its
exchange price. Thus, so long as these features of
advanced capitalism which I have analysed as structural,
persist, the international exchange price for gold, its
overall purchasing power in terms of national currencies
will tend to remain strong. While large fluctuations are
indeed very likely, since this is now a speculative market
and subject to many determinations,36 the underlying trend
for the gold price is likely to remain strong.
That this increase in the price of gold is not likely to
be a passing phenomenon, since it is linked to structural
features of contemporary capitalism has major implications
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for the trajectory of future capitalist development in South
Africa.
Ill PRINCIPAL FEATURES OF THE CURRENT UPSWING
IN THE SOUTH AFRICAN ECONOMY
The first fruits of the increase in the price of gold are
to be seen in the current upswing in the South African
economy.
Two features of the upswing stand out. Firstly, the
high rate of economic growth, which has accelerated. Real
GDP rose by 3,75 per cent in 1979 and in the first half of
1980 real GDP was 8,5 per cent higher than in the corres-
ponding period of 1979.37 Industrial production in June
1980 was fully 13 per cent higher than a year earlier.
This is in marked contrast with the steep declines for the
same period registered for most of the developed capitalist
countries.38 The second outstanding feature of the upswing
is its duration. Three years of uninterrupted expansion
make it one of the lengthiest upswings in the post-World War
Two period - exceeded only by the upswing lasting from
September 1961 to April 1965.
There are some signs of the rate of growth moderating in
the short term. Capacity utilisation in manufacturing is
at high levels,39 skilled labour is in ever-shorter supply,
export industries are likely to perform poorly as a result
of the weak economic position of the advanced capitalist
countries and finally, interest rates are likely to rise.
However, at present there is little likelihood of a major
economic downturn.
The key impetus to the upswing and the reason for its
long duration and likely continuance is, of course, provided
by the higher gold price. It is worth charting, albeit
briefly, the principal ways in which the higher gold price
has acted as a stimulus to the economy.
First, it has added substantially to governmental
revenue. In 1971 Government revenue from gold mining (tax
and share of profits) was about R120 million.40 By 1975
this had risen R745 million, but it declined to R320 million
in 1977. In 1978 the State's share rose dramatically to
R937,3 million.41 In 1979 State revenue rose 82 per cent
to R1.7030 million (State assistance to marginal mines
declined 70 per cent to a mere R8 million),42 and in the
first six months of 1980, the amount paid was R2.006 million
- an increase of 222,5 per cent over the same period in
1979.43
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This has allowed for easier taxation policies in regard
to the rest of the economy, and provides much leeway for
future tax concessions in the event of an economic downturn.
Second, as a direct contribution to GDP, gold's share
rose from 5,7 per cent in 1970, to 8,7 per cent in 1978 and
9,7 per cent in 1979.44 Further increases are anticipated
for 1980. Total mineral earnings rose from R1.563 million
in 1970, to an estimated R14.000-R15.000 million in 1980.45
Third, the indirect contribution gold mining has made to
the rest of the economy by providing a source of final
demand.46 The multiplier is said to be large, and the
domestic value-added component of gold mining production as
high as 93,7 per cent - with the import leakage thus very
low.47 The domestic value added is likely to have risen as
the mines employ a higher proportion of local labour and as
more intermediate and capital goods are produced locally.
There is also some indication that foreign share-holding has
declined marginally.43
Finally, and most critically, the increased price of gold
has had a profound effect upon the Balance of Payments.
South Africa's trade surplus was approximately R3.786 million
in the first seven months of 1980 - or 26 per cent higher
than in the same period in 1979.
... this year's surplus (1980) is entirely
attributable to buoyant gold export earnings.49
The gold price has more than kept up with international
inflation and comparing gold and oil prices over a ten-year
period from 1970, gold has increased more.5^ The terms of
trade including gold stand at 138 - as compared to 1 000 for
1972. 51 Moreover, the market value of South Africa's large
offical gold stocks also increased substantially. In the
past, economic upswings have been limited in their duration
and extent by emerging 'foreign exchange bottlenecks'. As
the economy has expanded so has the propensity to import,
while to a lesser extent, exports have increasingly been
diverted to the home market. Abstracting from gold, this
phenomenon is already very evident.52 The non-gold current
account is significantly adverse, and has been since the
beginning of 1979.53 But, the high price for gold has
produced a substantial surplus, and offical calculations
show that a gold price of $570 per ounce will be sufficient
to sustain a growth rate of 5,5 per cent.
But, the higher gold price has even more significant
implications which go beyond its immediate impact. The
medium- to long-term implications for capitalist development
in South Africa are equally profound.
The higher gold price has occasioned very significant
gold mining re-investment. The capital expenditure of the
gold mines rose from R448,3 million in 1978 to R689 million
in 1979 - an increase of 53,7 per cent.54 In the first six
months of 1980, capital expenditure has been estimated as
increasing by a further 21 per cent.55 While the surge in
gold mining investment has been most dramatic, increased
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investment is also very significant in other mining -
particularly coal. Capital expenditure by the mining
industry as a whole rose from R693 million in 1978, to
R1.013 million in 1979,56 and according to the President of
the Chamber of Mines, could top R3.000 million in 1981.57
The value of new mining ventures already announced and
scheduled to commence production on or before 1985, is well
in excess of R6.000 million at current prices.58
The effects of this massive capital expenditure will be
felt after a number of years. It will provide impetus to
accelerated growth throughout the economy and ameliorate any
downturn that might occur. The boom in South Africa post-
1962 was the outcome of both the crushing of popular resis-
tance and the removal of any immediate political threat, but
also the increase in mining investment which occurred during
the mid-1950s.59 There is a significant lagged relation-
ship between increases in mining and non-mining investment.
Increased capital investment has been far more signifi-
cant in gold mining than in manufacturing. For the year
ended June 1979, gross domestic fixed investment in gold
mining rose 23 per cent, and for the year ended June 1980,
it rose 39 per cent - a massive increase coming on top of a
major increase the year before. In manufacturing, gross
domestic fixed investment declined by nine percent in the
year ended June 1979. By June 1980, it had increased by 27
per cent - but this is less significant given the declines
in 1976 and 1977.60 One of the features of the present
upswing was the initial slow rate of growth of fixed invest-
ment in manufacturing. While this rate of increase has
picked up very markedly recently, this has been after years
of decline, and for the metal and engineering industries,
for example, projected capital investment for 1980 is still
below the figures for 1974-6.61
Whatever the final outcome of the different sectoral
investments, it seems clear that mining, and gold mining in
particular, has an increasing relative role to play in the
future - both in terms of contribution to GDP, and even more
especially, as an earner of foreign exchange.
This broad conclusion is further underlined by the
increasing concentration of gold mining on the lower-grade
ores. Grams per ton milled declined steadily from 13,18 in
1970, to 10,03 in 1974, 8,19 in 1979 and 7,45 grams in the
first six months of 1980. This has had the effect of
firstly very substantially increasing total mineable
reserves, and secondly of substantially extending the work-
ing lives of the existent gold mines. As a consequence,
all previous predictions about future output and the
exhaustion of gold deposits, have had to be substantially
revised.62 The perennial prediction of the coming exhaus-
tion of the gold mining industry, so often made in the past
and upon which much of South Africa's economic policies have
historically been partially based, again proves to be a mere
chimera.
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IV CONCLUSION
The expanded role for gold mining, and mining in general,
in the South African economy will critically affect the
whole pattern of social relations, in a wide variety of ways.
I want here to only broadly sketch out some implications for
the overall process of capitalist development. In particu-
lar, I want to examine critically some of those writings
which have seen South African development as necessarily
bound up with the expansion of manufacturing.
In the early 1970s, while the U.S. was finally closing
the 'gold window1, and before any substantial increase in
the gold price had occurred, the influential Reynders
Commission reported on South Africa's export trade.
Through the 1960s, the manufacturing industry which was a
substantial net importer, had grown faster than the primary
industries of agriculture and mining, both substantial net
exporters. This had produced a 'structural imbalance in
the Balance of Payments1.^3 The dynamic sector in the
economy, manufacturing industry, was thus likely to be
severely curtailed in its future growth, in the absence of
greater export earnings. The solution was seen to lie in
the rapid growth of manufactured exports.64
The Commission1s analysis and conclusions, in this regard,
were readily accepted by a number of writers operating with-
in a Marxist framework. Writing in 1978, by which time the
price of gold had already risen very substantially,
S. Clark reiterated the Commission's view:
If South Africa is not to rely on a continu-
ing run of unlikely accidents to sustain
accumulation, it is necessary to solve the
basic problem of the South African economy:
the problem of the uncompetitive nature of
South African manufacturing industry on
world markets.65
For Clarke, as for the Reynders Commission, the expansion
of manufacturing exports was the crucial sine qua non of
further South African capitalist development. Increases in
the price of gold were, in Clarke's analysis, simply rele-
gated to the never-never land of 'the unlikely accident' and
given no further consideration, while the Reynders
Commission reached its conclusions with reference to a fore-
cast of an increase in the gold price to $80 per ounce - a
forecast considered optimistic.6 6
But, their analysis of the immanent crucial 'barrier' to
further capitalist development in South Africa was not
simply inadequate as a consequence of a refusal to consider
the possibility of a substantial rise in gold prices. Both
Clarke and the Reynders commission present an analysis for
the manufacturing sector and its export propensities that is
highly questionable.
Clarke's analysis of why the South African manufacturing
sector had not up to 1978, and will not in the foreseeable
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future, be able to increase its export earnings, rests on a
view of the labour force as 'indisciplined1:
... the weakness of South African manufactur-
ing was never a technological weakness but
always has been a weakness in the social
relations of production. Thus South Africa
has been technologically backward because
capital has not installed modern technology
(sicl). This is certainly in part because
labour in the past was cheap, industry was
protected, and the labour force was not
highly skilled. However, modern technology
also requires a 'disciplined' 'responsible1
work force, and this South Africa did not
have.6 7
Faced with this, Clarke states that capital and the South
African State will be forced to undertake a process of
'restructuring1 :
This restructuring involves primarily the
intensification of labour and the tightening
of work discipline in the manufacturing
sector.68.
The crisis is therefore one of production, particularly
production in the manufacturing sector, which finds its
expression as an acute monetary and Balance of Payments
crisis:
In their attempts to resolve this crisis,
capital and the state in South Africa have
to take the initiative in intensifying the
class struggle, tightening labour control
at the point of production and increasing
the reserve army by the creation of rela-
tive surplus population. At this level
there is no possibility of compromise, no
basis on which concessions can be made to
defuse the growing political crisis.^9
Each of these suppositions is highly dubious. By what
standards is South African industry technologically back-
ward? Most centrally, what is meant by a 'disciplined1 and
'responsible' labour force? Surely, throughout the 1960s
and up until at least the Durban strikes of 1973, the period
that Clarke is concerned with in respect of the development
of manufacturing, South Africa had, from capital's viewpoint,
an extremely 'disciplined' and 'responsible' work force? -
measured in terms of strike activity, trade union regulation,
the functioning of labour allocation mechanisms, etc.70
The Reynders Commission's analysis of the barriers to
exporting on the part of the manufacturing sector stipulated
a number of factors - a lack of export consciousness, the
small size of firms, lack of knowledge, activities geared to
import replacement and a rapid rise in domestic demand:
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... the Commission has concluded that the
industrial philosophy of a fairly signifi-
cant number of local businessmen is not
adjusted/attuned to exporting, and they are
not equipped mentally, psychologically or
physically (plant, equipment etc.) to enter
this market.71
When the Commission made reference to the labour force,
it tended to stress the shortage of skilled labour, the
inadequate training of blacks, statutory barriers to 'Black
advancement' and the gap between earnings and productivity.
Labour 'indiscipline' or its equivalent did not feature in
its analysis.72
One very central feature of South African manufacturing,
namely the presence of extensive foreign ownership and
control, nowhere features in Clarke's analysis of the
barriers to increased manufactured exports. This is not at
all surprising. Clarke's analysis of the 'Crisis' in South
Africa,73 concludes an article designed to deny the validity
of a so-called 'fractionalist analysis of South African
capitalism1. The so-called fractionalists had put particu-
lar emphasis on the divisions existent between foreign and
local/national capital in South Africa's historical develop-
ment.74 Clarke strongly denied the validity of this
distinction, and substituted an analysis based on 'capital
in general', in which no distinction is made between such
fractions.75
The Reynders Commission, working within a Neo-classical
theoretical framework, also has no concept of foreign
capital central to its analysis of the operations of South
African manufacturing industry. But, at a significant
number of points in its report, the Commission records
empirically the importance of this division.
Thus, in respect of the automobile industry, the
Commission noted:
Apart from cost disadvantages, local manu-
facturers/assemblers are all tied to over-
seas principals who are generally unwilling
to allow the local firms to export. This
state of affairs must be regarded as disadvan-
tageous ... especially as regards exports.7^
In regard to the factors impeding South African capital
goods exports to less developed countries, the Commission
again noted the importance of foreign ownership and control:
There is also the fact that a not insignifi-
cant proportion of the manufacturing sector
is controlled by international concerns,
which naturally (sicl), give first priority
to internal operations. The result of this
practice is that South African subsidiaries
of some international concerns do not export
at all, although it is also true that others.
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because of their international character,
are exporters of some significance.77
In respect of firms which utilised imported research and
development in the form of franchises etc. , these were
frequently accompanied by restrictive clauses:
Market restricting clauses ... limited the
ability of local users to benefit from
economies of scale by exporting; this was
particularly valid in those cases where the
user had achieved some success in the
domestic market - the restricting clause in
effect precluded him {sic1.) from expanding
his operations and achieving greater success
... It was furthermore submitted that South
Africa was at times looked upon as an outlet
for relatively obsolescent products, tech-
niques and processes which would in any case
have left little leeway for local users to
compete in the international market even if
there were no restrictive arrangement.
Lastly, it was stated that where the product
was composed of a number of components, the
user was allowed to manufacture a limited
range only and then required to import from
the supplier at high prices certain vital
components which were relatively easy and
lucrative to manufacture.78
Foreign subsidiaries were often reluctant to export:
Witnesses also alleged that the actions of
many of these subsidiaries were determined
by the interests of the parent company, e.g.
should the local subsidiary wish to export
it might be precluded therefrom by the fact
that the parent company already had a plant
in the territory concerned.79
And, in respect of foreign subsidiaries overall:
In regard to subsidiaries of foreign
concerns, the Commission was told that only
a small number of these participated active-
ly in exports, and that in these cases only
a relatively small percentage were positive
exporters i.e. exported more than they
imported ... Moreover, very few of them
which manufacture intermediate goods had
investigated the exporting of their products
to the parent company. A large number
appear to be restricted to the local market
or are restricted to export to certain
countries only. No statistical evidence is
available to substantiate these tendencies,
but the Commission is satisfied that on the
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whole, they do present a fairly valid picture
of the situation.80
In a world in which almost half of all trade is conducted
by MNCs, and with about 4 0 per cent of international trade
by capitalist countries accounted for by inter-firm trade or
trade with related parties,81 it is clear that the
operations of MNCs play a critical role in the regulation
and limitations confronting countries' capacities to expand
their export earnings. It would seem clear that, in the
case of South African manufactured exports, and the Reynders
Commission findings support this, albeit that specific micro
studies are lacking,82 exporters are constrained via a range
of technological agreements that prohibit/inhibit export, by
the 'unwillingness' of subsidiaries to export to markets
where another subsidiary is already in existence, and the
general global profitability considerations of the MNCs
which regulate inter-affiliate trade. The other side of
the coin is that the high import propensity of the manufac-
turing sector, just as its low export propensity, cannot be
seen apart from extensive foreign ownership and control
which ties subsidiaries to import from Head Office, or other
related subsidiaries, even where such products are locally
available.83
Foreign control - whether exercised via majority- or
minority-ownership or via forms of licensing agreements - is
particularly prevalent in South African manufacturing
industry. In agriculture, foreign participation is very
small, v/hile in mining, although foreign firms are not
insignificant, the sector is, in the contemporary period,
predominantly owned and controlled by South African
capital.84 Apart from dividend payments, the earnings of
the mining houses are not subject to significant remission
abroad. Backward and forward linkages are likely to be
effected with domestic producers and not subject to transfer
pricing.85 At the level of research and development and
technological contracting, the South African mining industry
is itself pioneering much new innovation. The Chamber of
Mines is at present directing a major ten-year programme of
collaborative research which has already yielded many signi-
ficant innovations.86 Technological 'independence' is thus
far more pronounced in this sector than in manufacturing and
the subsequent remissions abroad in the form of technology
payments will be far less than in manufacturing.87
The expansion of exports from the mining sector, gold
mining in particular but not excluding other mineral
products, such as coal, in the situation of higher 'energy'
prices, is thus not only likely to continue, given the
context of the continuing international capitalist crisis,
but is indeed, from the standpoint of capital, likely to
contain considerably greater 'benefits' than an expansion
based on manufactured products. Moreover, in a world in
which international trade amongst capitalist nations is
dominated by the MNCs, it is by no means certain, contrary
The Current 'Upswing' in the South African Economy 17
to Clarke, that any amount of 'restructuring1, performed at
a national level, can yield a significant expansion in manu-
factured exports.
Euro-centric models prescribe a single path to capitalist
development - that of industrialisation. But, precisely
because such industrialisation can today only occur at the
'periphery', under the domination of the MNCs, i.e. what is
frequently termed 'dependent industrialisation88 - the
development of manufacturing tends to accentuate rather than
mitigate the Balance of Payments crises that accompany high
rates of growth.89 As the world's principal producer of
gold and with a mining sector which is domestically owned
and controlled, the trajectory of capitalist development in
South Africa is likely to follow a significantly different
path.90
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NOTES
1. But even in 1929, a few countries, e.g. Sweden, did not
experience major declines in output.
2. OECD: 'Perspectives Economiques1, No. 19, July 1976.
3. With the exception of the U.K., which had its lowest
industrial production in the fourth quarter of 19 74,
all the OECD countries had their lowest industrial
production within the first three quarters of 1975.
Ibid.
4. United Nations: 'Economic Survey of Europe in 1976',
New York. Quoted in E. Mandel (1978), 147.
5. For a simple account of the development of the Euro-
dollar market see B. Tew (1977), Chapter 13.
6. "National monetary management has been made more
difficult mainly because of the increased opportunities
(and profitability) opened up by Euro-dollar dealing
for arbitrage operations. In this way it has
increased the internal constraint on the use of
monetary policy as a weapon for internal economic
stabilisation ...", S. Strange (1976), • 186 .
7. R. Murray (1980), e.g. 76-7: in 1973, the German
Bundesbank calculated that changes in methods of pay-
ment by MNCs had been responsible for a very
significant movement in the Balance of Payments.
8. Of course, Central Banks too can, and have been,
involved in speculation.
9. See in particular W. Nordhause, 'The Falling Share of
Profit1, Brookings Papers on Economic Activity No. 1
(1974). For the U.K. see A. Glynn and B. Sutcliffe
(1971), and The Economist, 6 September 1975. For
references to studies inter alia on West Germany, Italy
and France see E. Mandel (1978), 24-6.
10. See Business Week for quarterly tables on the profit-
ability of U.S. corporations.
11. In Marx's analysis the rate of profit is given by the
following formula:
r = s/c+v.
Dividing through by v: _ s/v
c/v + 1
i.e., the rate of profit varies proportionately with
the rate of exploitation and inversely with the organic
composition of capital.
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12. The increase in oil prices was not the principal cause
of the onset of capitalist crisis in the developed
countries. It did contribute to it, but the falling
rate of profit, the root cause of the recession, was
already evident well before 1973.
With substantial investments in energy projects which
are only viable at a high price for energy, many
advanced capitalist countries, and particularly the
important 'energy' companies within them, are not
likely to welcome a significant fall in oil prices.
13. E. Mandel (1978), 88.
14. e.g. in the U.S. real wages for workers tended to fall.
15. e.g. the W.T. Grant Company in the U.S. or the Kohjin
Company in Japan.
16. Also with the banks according credit very liberally to
their larger customers: M. Castells (1980), 116.
17. Governmental support for 'lame ducks' results not pre-
eminently from 'political factors', but from the fact
that their survival is often a sine qua non of main-
taining an integrated national economy. The loss of
British Leyland for example would have manifold effects
upon all of British capital, increasing Britain's
degree of integration into the world economy.
18. E. Mandel (1978), 94.
19. The power of organised labour is often invoked as a
further, if not principal factor, causing inflation.
With wage increases lagging well behind price increases
for several years now, in many of the advanced
capitalist countries, this explanation is hardly
adequate. Demands for wage increases are often
defensive - a reaction to, rather than a cause of price
rises. However, the power of organised labour has
acted as a brake on capital's power to reduce the level
of real wages and so raise the rate of profit via cost-
cutting. Castells puts it this way:
"Because markets are controlled largely by monopoly
capital, corporations are able to impose the prices
they want. The increasing cost of living triggers
workers' demands for more wages at the level of
production. The wages obtained through struggle and
bargaining will be added by monopoly capital to the
prices charged for commodities. This does not mean
that workers' demands are the cause of inflation, as
capitalist propaganda argues. What it does mean is
that one of the causes of inflation is that corpora-
tions find it increasingly difficult to raise their
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profits through direct exploitation and therefore raise
prices for the whole society in order to preserve their
privileges". M. Castells (1980), 64.
20. Ibid., 62.
21. Ibid.
22. In the 1974-5 recession, prices of raw materials tended
to decline and so moderated inflation.
23. See S. Strange (1976), 186.
24. "The major factor causing the exceptional rise in the
gold price has been the world demand for gold as a
hedge against economic uncertainty and/ in particular,
currency weakness, with the price of gold accelerating
in terms of all major currencies." Chamber of Mines,
Presidential Address, 1979. At the same time,
industrial demand for gold has been price-inelastic.
25. See S. Strange (1976), 67.
26. Ibid., 69.
27. Total official dollar balances were $3b.. in 1949, $10b.
in 1960 and $5ib. by 1971.
28. This point was made as early as 1963, by the so-called
Fairleigh-Dickinson study, N.S. Fatemi, T. de Saint
Phalle and G.M. Keefe, The Dollar Crisis, Fairleigh-
Dickinson University Press (1963) .
29. For an analysis of U.S. monetary policy which clearly
examines this as an aspect of U.S. imperialism, see
F. Block (1978) .
30. Economists associated with this strategy include
Kindelberger, Krause and Salant.
31. This absorbtion is not 'complete' since much of the
dollars were required to finance the expansion in
world trade.
32. There are some signs that this 'monetary hegemony' may
eventually be challenged by a European currency, the
European Monetary Unit: see Fitt, Fair and Vigier
(1980), postscript to Part 2.
33. The distinction between national and international is
not clear-cut.
34. Between 1884 when significant gold production in South
Africa began until 1932, with the exception of the
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years 1919-1924 when gold earned a fluctuating premium,
the money price of gold was fixed.
35. One manifestation of this has been the massive rise of
loans to the LDCs.
36. Especially in respect of changing interest rates, which
affect the opportunity cost of holding gold in the form
of interest payments foregone.
37. South African Reserve Bank, Quarterly Bulletin,
September 1980, 6.
38. For the same period, the U.S. decline was 7,3 per cent,
the U.K. 6,4 per cent and West Germany 1,5 per cent:
Barclays Bank, Business Brief, September 1980.
39. Ibid., 2.
40. Bureau for Economic Policy and Analysis, 'The Gold
Price Bonanza1, No. 25, March 1980.
41. Chamber of Mines, Annual Report, 1978, 8.
42. Chamber of Mines, Newsletter, Vol. 3, No. 2, 25 March
1980, 4.
43. Chamber of Mines, Newsletter, Vol. 3, No. 6,
22 September 1980, 3.
44. Bureau for Economic Policy and Analysis (BEPA), op. cit.
45. Chamber of Mines, Newsletter, Vol. 3, No. 7, 1.
46. BEPA, op. cit.
47. Chamber of Mines, Newsletter, Vol. 3, No. 7, 5.
48. Chamber of Mines, March Report, 1979, 1.
49. Standard Bank, Review, September 1980, 4.
50. BEPA, op. cit.
51. South African Reserve Bank, Quarterly Bulletin,
September 1980, Table 9.1.
52. "The sustained current account surplus during a period
of cyclical upswing did not conform to the historical
cyclical pattern, according to which surpluses emerge
during the advanced stages of cyclical downturns and
disappear relatively early during the subsequent
upswings ... The progressively larger surpluses up to
the first quarter of 1980 were predominantly the result
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of an exceptionally strong rise in the price of gold..."
South African Reserve Bank, Annual Economic Report,
1980, 19.
53. "When gold is excluded, the balance on current account
has deteriorated significantly since early 1979."
Standard Bank, Review, September 1980, 2.
54. Chamber of Mines, Newsletter, Vol. 3, No. 2, 4.
55. Ibid., Vol. 3, No. 6, 3.
56. South African Reserve Bank, Quarterly Bulletin,
September 1980, Table 5.32.
57. Chamber of Mines, Newsletter, Vol. 3, No. 7, 1.
58. Ibid.
59. For which the decisive precondition was the defeat of
the working classes in the post-War period.
60. Standard Bank, Review, September 1980, 4.
61. Statistics, September 1980, 141. Figures derived from
SEIFSA: Survey of New Capital Investment in the Metal
and Engineering Industries in 1979 and Projections for
1980.
62. The Chamber now estimates that gold production will be
steady at approximately 700 tons per annum until 1987.
It will then decline to 350 tons by the end of the
century. But this is based on gold prices which are
fairly conservative. Chamber of Mines, Newsletter,
Vol. 3, No. 1, 1980, 2.
63. Reynders Commission (RC), 15.
64. "... even a maximum exploitation of South Africa's
mineral wealth will not adequately provide in (sic! )
the foreign exchange needs of the country, so that the
export of manufactured goods will have to be increased
as rapidly as possible." RC, 19.
65. S. Clarke, "Capital, Fractions of Capital and the State:
'Neo-Marxist Analysis of the South African State'",




e . g . , see
SC, 70.
I b id .
RC, 246.
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69. Ibid., 71.
70- Further points could be made about Clarke's political





74. e.g., see R. Davies, D. Kaplan, D. O'Meara and
M. Morris, 'Class Struggle and the Periodisation of the
State in South Africa1, Review of African Political
Economy, No. 7, 1977.
75. Absence of this distinction, I believe, leads Clarke to
ultimately ignore imperialism altogether - both
historically and in the contemporary period.




80. RC, 609, i.e. it affects not only the propensity to
export, but also raises their propensity to import.
81. R. Murray (1980), Chapter 2.
82. Ibid.: a related party is one in which a firm has
anything above a five per cent shareholding.
83. Thus, the ' foreign connection' is just as vital in the
explanation of the high import propensity of the manu-
facturing sector (something that Clarke, and to a
lesser extent the Reynders Commission, simply accept as
intrinsic) as an explanation of its low export propen-
sity.
84. Particularly with the rise of Anglo-American to
dominance.
85. For reference to low import propensity see Note 47.
86. e.g. see Chamber of Mines, Annual Report, 1979, 13.
87. see RC, Chapter 14.
88. e.g. N. Poulantsas,
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89. As has most clearly happened in the case of Brazil.
90. But 'development1 should be understood not as develop-
ment for all, but as capitalist development. For
example, even with the current upswing, employment is
growing at less than half of the rate of population
increase. Sanlam Economic Survey - quoted in the
Financial Mail, 31 October 1980.
